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CHANGING THE TIDE OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY IN THE CONTEXT OF
CONTINUING CRIMINAL
ENTERPRISE
Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Rutledge v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a court may convict and impose concur-
rent sentences for continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) 2 and
conspiracy to distribute controlled substances,3 a predicate offense of
CCE.4 The Court held that conspiracy is a lesser included offense of
CCE and that convictions for both offenses based upon the same un-
derlying conduct violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.5 This decision ended
eighteen years of ambiguity and confusion among the circuits created
after Congress passed the CCE statute in 1970 and the Court pub-
lished an ambiguous decision, Jeffers v. United States.6 In reaching its
decision, the Court relied upon its historical interpretation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause as prohibiting multiple punishments for the
"same offense."7 The Court looked to the clear language of the CCE
and conspiracy statutes in determining that, because the conspiracy
statute describes a lesser included offense of CCE, conspiracy is the
"same offense" as CCE.8 Thus, the Court remanded the case for vaca-
tion of one the convictions.9
This Note contends that the Court's failure to address inconsis-
tencies between its reasoning in Rutledge and several of its prior deci-
1 116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996).
2 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994).
3 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994).
4 Rutledge, 116 S. Ct. at 1241.
5 Id. at 1250-51.
6 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
7 Rutedge, 116 S. Ct. at 1245; see U.S. CONST. amend. V, which provides, in pertinent
part, "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice in jeopardy of life or
limb...."
8 Id. at 1247.
9 Id. at 1251.
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sions in similar contexts will lead to confusion far greater than that
resolved by the decision. First, the Court's conclusion that Congress
did not intend to provide multiple punishment when CCE and drug
conspiracy arise from the same act disregarded and is inconsistent
with its analysis of congressional intent in Garrett v. United Statesl °
where it faced a similar issue." Second, the Court's reliance upon the
BlockburgeI'2 "same-elements test" to conclude that conspiracy is a
lesser included offense of CCE shared improper disregard for the
question of whether the test should apply to compound offenses such
as CCE. Finally, the Court's decision is inconsistent with its pro-
nouncements in an analogous context, the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act' 3 ("RICO"), in which the court has said
that convictions for both RICO and conspiracy do not constitute
double jeopardy.1 4
II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that no person shall be "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb" for the
same offense.15 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
Clause to provide three constitutional safeguards for defendants.' 6
The Clause "protects against a second prosecution for the same of-
fense after acquittal. It protects against prosecution for the same of-
fense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments
for the same offense."' 7
In determining whether cumulative punishments or successive
prosecutions violate the multiple punishment prong of the double
jeopardy protection, the Court looks at whether two statutes relate to
the "same offense."18 The Court has traditionally used the test
promulgated in Blockburger v. United States,'9 sometimes referred to as
10 471 U.S. 773 (1985) (holding that conviction for CCE and narcotics importation, a
predicate offense of CCE, does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause).
"1 Id.
12 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (stating that two statutes de-
fine separate offenses if each requires proof of a fact that the other does not).
13 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S.
915 (1991).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (holding that
the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause applies to states through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
16 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
17 Id. (citations omitted).
18 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
19 Id. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993), overruled Grady v. Corbin, 495
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the "same-elements" test, to determine whether two statutes punish
the "same offense."20 In Blockburger, the Court said that two offenses
are not the same if "each provision requires proof of a fact which the
other does not."21 The Court's subsequent decisions expanded the
test to provide that two statutes define the "same offense" if one is a
lesser included offense of the other.22
More recently, the Court has used the Blockburger test as a means
of determining congressional intent rather than as a strict rule to de-
termine whether there has been a violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.23 The Court has said that the Double Jeopardy Clause "does
no more than -prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater
punishment than the legislature intended."24 Thus, offenses are not
the same for double jeopardy purposes if Congress intended cumula-
tive prosecution and sentencing for an offense and its lesser included
offense.25 Therefore, even if the Blockburger test suggests that the of-
fenses overlap for double jeopardy purposes, courts may still impose
punishments for each offense if Congress made clear its intention to
authorize such action.26 However, in analyzing this issue, courts must
presume that the legislature did not intend to impose two punish-
ments for the same offense absent clear evidence to the contrary.27
In addition, the Supreme Court has expanded the notion of what
constitutes "punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy.28 First, the
Court has said that fines should be treated the same as cunmlative
prison sentences. 29 Thus, as the Court stated in Jeffers v. United
States,30 when a defendant is convicted of multiple, overlapping of-
fenses, a fine for each constitutes multiple punishment in violatioi of
U.S. 508 (1990), thus ending a long debate by holding that courts should apply the Block-
burger "same elements" test rather than the Grady "same conduct" test in determining
whether two statutes define the same offense.
20 Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696.
21 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
22 See, e.g., Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 861-64 (1985) (holding that prosecution
for both "receipt" and "possession" of a firearm is multiple punishment because receipt
necessitates proof of possession); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693-94 (1980)
(holding that rape and felony murder predicated on the rape constitute the same offense,
and barred prosecution for both); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977) (stating that
the Blockburger test leads to the conclusion thatjoyriding is a lesser included offense of auto
theft).
23 Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
24 Id. at 366.
25 See, e.g., id.; Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 794-95 (1985).
26 See, e.g., Garrett 471 U.S. at 794-95; Hunter, 459 U.S. at 369.
27 See, e.g., Bal, 470 U.S. at 861; Whalen, 445 U.S. at 691-92.
28 See, e.g.,Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 (1977); North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).




the Double Jeopardy Clause.3'
Second, in Ball v. United States,32 the Court said that collateral
consequences may constitute impermissible multiple punishment.
33
The Court's examples of possible collateral consequences included:
delaying the defendant's eligibility for parole, an increased sentence
for a future offense, impeachment in future legal proceedings, and
exacerbated societal stigma.3 4 Even when prison sentences run con-
currently, the existence of collateral consequences makes it as imper-
missible to impose a second conviction as to impose a cumulative
prison sentence.3 5 Therefore, where collateral consequences result, a
prosecutor may seek and try more than one indictment, but a court
can only convict and sentence a defendant for one of those counts.3
6
B. CONTINUING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE
In 1970, Congress responded to the country's drug problems by
enacting the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act 37 This Act shifted the focus of drug enforcement from small time
users to drug peddlers, or "kingpins."38 The Act created the crime of
"continuing criminal enterprise" ("CCE"), for which a conviction re-
sults in mandatory sentences without parole. 39 Section 848 CCE is a
compound crime.4 The statute provides
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a
continuing criminal enterprise if-(1) he violates any provision of this
subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter the punishment for which is
a felony and (2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of viola-
tions of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter-(A) which are
undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other persons
with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a
supervisory position, or any other position of management, and (B)
from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.4 '
31 Id.
32 470 U.S. 856 (1985) (holding that the Government could seek an indictment against
defendant for receiving and possessing same weapon, but defendant could not suffer two
convictions or sentences on that indictment).




37 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1994).
38 See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, H.R. REP. No.
91-1444 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4570; see also Garrett v. United States,
471 U.S. 773, 781 (1985); Susan W. Brenner, S. C.A.RF.A.C.E.: A Speculation on Double Jeop-
ardy and Compound Criminal Liability, 27 NEw ENG. L. REv. 915, 935-36 (1993).
39 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994).
40 See id. A "compound crime" is one in which two or more criminal elements must
exist in order for the crime to exist. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 286 (6th ed. 1990).
41 21 U.S.C. § 848(c).
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That is, the government must show that the defendant committed a
series of narcotic violations, or "predicate offenses," while organizing
or supervising at least five other people and deriving substantial in-
come from the operation. 42
C. IMPLICATIONS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN CCE CONTEXT
Although the CCE offense had been the subject of extensive con-
stitutional scrutiny since its inception in 1970 and amendments in
1984,43 The Supreme Court did not answer the constitutional ques-
tion of whether convictions for CCE and any of its predicate offenses
based upon the same series of actions violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause until 1996.44 Before Rutledge, the Supreme Court had dealt
with this issue only two times and had not heard a CCE case since
1985.5 In the interim, several lines of decisions developed among
federal circuit courts as to whether the courts can enter convictions
and sentences for both CCE and its predicate offense of narcotics con-
spiracy where a jury returns verdicts of guilty for both charges.46
1. Supreme Court Decisions
a. Jeffers v. United States47
Jeffers v. United States was the first case in which the Supreme
Court addressed CCE. In Jeffers, a grand jury returned two indict-
ments against Jeffers. 48 The first charged him with § 846 narcotics
conspiracy and § 841 substantive distribution, which are both predi-
cate offenses to CCE.49 The second indictment charged him with op-
erating a CCE.50 The Government moved to join the indictments
under one trial stating that the offensive acts involved a common
plan.5' The court denied this motion.52 Then the Government made
the seemingly contradictory claim, in response to a double jeopardy
42 See id.
43 See Phillip H. Cherney, Thrice injeopardy: The CCE Prosecution ofFelix Mitchell 27 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 515, 516 (1987) (discussing the Court's fleshing out of issues relating to
vagueness and cruel and unusual punishment).
44 Id.
45 See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985);Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137
(1977).
46 See infra Part ll.C.2.
47 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
48 Id. at 140.
49 Id. Section 848 requires, among other things, that the defendant acted "in concert
with five or more other persons," while § 846 requires agreement among the defendant
and one or more other parties. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(c).
50 Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 141.




argument in Jeffers motion to dismiss, that the § 846 conspiracy and
§ 848 CCE were wholly separate offenses.53 The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss, implicitly accepting the argument that neither the
parties nor the charges for each offense were the same. 4
After conviction for conspiracy in the first trial, Jeffers moved to
dismiss the CCE case against him.55 Contrary to his argument against
the Government's joinder motion, Jeffers said that CCE and conspir-
acy were the same offense, so prosecution for CCE after his conviction
for conspiracy violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.56 The trial court
rejected the motion, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.5 7 Jeffers ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court.58
The Supreme Court refused to consider whether the Govern-
ment's use of a single series of actions to prove both § 846 conspiracy
and § 848 CCE violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.5 9 Instead, a plu-
rality held that by electing to have the offenses tried in separate pro-
ceedings, the defendant waived any right he may have had to object to
the subsequent prosecution for CCE.60 Justice White concurred with
the judgment based upon his conclusion that conspiracy is not a lesser
included offense of CCE. 61 Thus, the Court allowed both of Jeffers'
convictions to stand.62
Although the Court did not squarely decide the constitutionality
of convictions for both conspiracy and CCE, the opinion strongly sug-
gested that, absent extentuating circumstances such as those in Jeffers,
this would violate the Fifth Amendment.6 First, although the Court's
holding rendered it unnecessary for the plurality to examine the
lesser included offense issue, the Court assumed that conspiracy was a
lesser included offense of CCE "for purposes of argument."64 The
plurality rejected the Government's argument that the "in concert"
language in § 848 required something different than the element of
"agreement" required by § 846 for a conviction of narcotics conspir-
acy.65 Thus, the Court concluded that § 846 conspiracy is a lesser in-




57 SeeJeffers v. United States, 532 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1976).
58 Jeffers, 432 U.S. 137.
59 Id. at 152.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 158 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 149-57.
64 Id. at 149-50.
65 Id. at 148-49.
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cluded offense of § 848 CCE.6
Finally, after concluding that the government had the right to
prosecute the defendant for both offenses, the plurality examined
whether the court could permissibly impose cumulative punishment
in the form of separate fines.6 7 The Court said that even though the
Government had the right to try the defendant for both offenses, Con-
gress did not intend for courts to impose multiple penalties.68 Thus,
the Court remanded the case to reduce the total of the defendant's
two fines from $125,000 to $100,000, the maximum amount allowable
under § 848.69
b. Garrett v. United States7"
Examining a similar issue, the Court in Garrett v. United States held
that a conviction for CCE and narcotics importation, a substantive
predicate offense 71 of CCE, did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause.72
Garrett organized and directed an enterprise that imported and
distributed marijuana.73 He pled guilty to a charge for importing, and
ajury sentenced him to five years in prison and a $15,000 fine.74 Two
months later and in a different district, the Government charged him
with CCE.75 Based upon evidence of importation used to prove the
previous charge, the jury found Garrett guilty.76 The court sentenced
Garrett to forty years imprisonment to be served consecutively with his
earlier sentence. 77 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.78
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant claimed that his
conviction for CCE violated double jeopardy because facts from his
66 Id. at 150-51. The Court went on to say that although Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161
(1977), prohibits prosecution for a greater offense and its lesser included offense, as this
would be prosecution for the "same offense" in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause,
the defendant triggered an exception to Brown by electing to have the offenses tried in
separate proceedings.
67 Jeffers, 482 U.S. at 155-57.
68 Id. at 157.
69 Id. at 157-58.
70 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
71 Courts often distinguish between a "substantive" predicate offense, that is one which
is complete in itself and not dependent upon another, and a predicate offense of "conspir-
acy" which depends upon the existence of another "target crime" contemplated by the
conspiracy.
72 Garrett, 471 U.S. at 793.
73 Id. at 775.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 776.
76 Id. at 776-77.
77 Id.
78 Garrett v. United States, 727 F. 2d 1003 (11th Cir. 1984).
9731997]
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prior conviction for drug importation were used to prove necessary
elements of CCE.79 The defendant said that since his prior conviction
was for a lesser included offense of CCE, the conviction implicated
both the multiple punishment and the successive punishment prongs
of double jeopardy.80
In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist,81 the Court held that
because Congress intended to allow cumulative sentences for CCE
and conspiracy, the convictions did not violate double jeopardy.8 2 Jus-
tice Rehnquist said that the language, structure and legislative history
of the Controlled Substances Act indicate that Congress intended
CCE to be a distinct offense punishable in addition to, not as an alter-
native for, predicate offenses.8 3 The Court assumed that, absent evi-
dence to the contrary, in creating CCE and its predicate offenses,
Congress intended to authorize cumulative punishment.8 4
The Court briefly distinguished this case from Jeffers.85 Justice
Rehnquist said that in the case of conspiracy and CCE, the dangers to
be protected against are sufficiently similar, and thus cumulative pun-
ishment is unnecessary.8 6 The Court stated that convictions for CCE
and a substantive predicate offense such as drug importation, are dis-
tinguishable, so that the Court in Garrett faced a distinct issue not ad-
dressed in Jeffers.87
2. Split in the Circuits
The federal circuit courts utilized differing interpretations of the
Supreme Court's pronouncements on double jeopardy in the context
of CCE and conspiracy.88 The approaches differed in whether they
allowed convictions and sentences for each offense. The ambiguity of
Jeffers and the lack of a consistent standard left the multiple punish-
79 Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 777-78 (1985).
80 Id.
81 Justice Rehnquist was joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Blackmun, White,
and O'Connor.
82 Garrett, 471 U.S. at 793.
83 Id. at 778-86.
84 Id. at 793.
85 Id. at 794.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 794-95.
88 See United States v. Rutledge, 40 F.3d 879, 886 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a court
may enter convictions for both CCE and conspiracy); United States v. Medina, 940 F.2d
1247 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a court can only enter judgment for either CCE or
conspiracy, but if one of the convictions is overturned on appeal, the other may be rein-
stated); United States v. Aiello 771 F.2d 621, 632-35 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that findings
of guilt for CCE and conspiracy must be combined and entered as a single conviction);
United States v. Smith, 703 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that courts
may enter only one judgment on convictions for CCE and conspiracy).
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ment prong of double jeopardy in "disarray."8 9
A majority of the circuits have held that courts may enter only
one judgment when ajury finds a defendant guilty of both conspiracy
and CCE.90 Most of these courts interpretedJeffers to prohibit convic-
tions and sentences for both offenses.91 These courts believed that
Jeffers concluded that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense of CCE, so
punishments for both, would violate double jeopardy. 2 Some of the
majority courts cited the Court's decision in Ball v. United States93 as
support for the conclusion that CCE and conspiracy convictions vio-
late double jeopardy's prohibition against multiple punishment be-
cause of the adverse collateral consequences of a second conviction. 94
The Second and Third Circuits adopted an intermediate posi-
tion.95 In those circuits, when ajury returns verdicts of guilty for CCE
and conspiracy charges based on the underlying conduct, the courts
"combined" the two convictions into a single count.96 The punish-
ment for this count could not exceed that maximum allowable for the
greater offense.97
The Ninth Circuit took a position similar to the Second and
Third Circuits. 98 Although it did not specifically address a conviction
for CCE and § 846 conspiracy, the Ninth Circuit adopted a general
approach for cases in which the court may charge and try a defendant
for two offenses but may enter only one conviction.99 In such cases,
the court stayed the sentence and entry ofjudgment of conviction on
all but one count.100 Then, the Circuit authorized the district court to
89 Fernandez v. United States, 500 U.S. 948 (1991) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
90 See, e.g., United States v.Jones, 918 F.2d 909 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); United
States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Butler, 885 F.2d 195 (4th
Cir. 1989); Smith, 703 F.2d at 627; United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1979).
91 See Jones, 918 F.2d at 909; Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1462; Smith, 703 F.2d at 627; Butler, 885
F.2d at 195; Miche4 588 F.2d at 986.
92 Jones, 918 F.2d at 909; Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1462; Smith, 703 F.2d at 627; Butler, 885 F.2d
at 195; Mihe, 588 F.2d at 986.
93 470 U.S. 856 (1985).
94 United States v. Montanye, 962 F.2d 1332, 1346-47 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v.
David, 940 F.2d 722, 738-39 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Schuster, 769 F.2d 337, 343-45
(6th Cir. 1985).
95 See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 916 F.2d 125, 128-29 (3d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Aiello 771 F.2d 621, 632-35 (2d Cir. 1985).
96 See Fernandez, 916 F.2d at 128-29; Aie//o, 771 F.2d at 632-35.
97 See Fernandez, 916 F.2d at 128-29; Aiello, 771 F.2d at 632-35.
98 SeeUnited States v. Medina, 940 F.2d 1247, 1252-53 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Palafox, 764 F.2d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 1985).
99 See Medina, 940 F.2d at 1252-53; Palafox, 764 F.2d at 564.
100 Cf United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1582 (9th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that conviction on drug conspiracy offense must be vacated in light of CCE conviction,
but not stating whether drug conspiracy conviction could be reinstated if CCE conviction
9751997]
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enter ajudgment of conviction and sentence on the remaining count
or counts if a court ultimately reverses the entered conviction.101
The Seventh Circuit's position on this issue was at odds with all of
the other circuits. 10 2 The Seventh Circuit held that double jeopardy
allowed separate convictions for CCE and conspiracy, as long as the
cumulative sentence did not exceed the maximum allowable under
the CCE statute.'03 Like the other circuits, the Seventh Circuit cited
Jeffers as support for this conclusion. 10 4 The court interpreted the Jef-
fers Court's upholding of concurrent sentences as condoning separate
sentences.' 05 Also, in United States v. Bond,10 6 the Seventh Circuit re-
jected the Ball Court's approach to collateral consequences of multi-
ple convictions.' 0 7 The Bond court stated that the unavailability of
parole for the CCE conviction negates the concern that multiple con-
victions will hurt the defendant at parole time. 108
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Tommy Rutledge organized and supervised a cocaine distribu-
tion enterprise from November 1986 until his arrest by federal agents
in December 1990.109 Rutledge began the enterprise by personally
making biweekly deliveries of cocaine to Roger Malott in Astoria, Illi-
nois. 110 Rutledge initially purchased the cocaine fromJuan Gonzalez,
an acquaintance from prison and a member of Chicago's Latin Kings
street gang."'
Rutledge's operations continued when he moved from Chicago
to Youngstown, Illinois.' 1 2 In Youngstown, Rutledge relied upon Ro-
berto Laurel, another member of the Latin Kings, to provide weapons
and drugs.113 Around this time, Rutledge recruited Malott and at
least seven others to join his enterprise. 1 4  These employees deliv-
was overturned).
101 See, e.g., id.
102 See, e.g., United States v. Rutledge, 40 F.3d 879, 886 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465, 1473 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233, 1238-39
(7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 270 (1996).
10- See, e.g., Rutledge, 40 F.3d at 886; Bafia, 949 F.2d at 1473; Bond, 847 F.2d at 1238-39.
104 See, e.g., Rutledge, 40 F.3d at 886; Bafia, 949 F.2d at 1473; Bond, 847 F.2d at 1238-39.
105 Bond, 847 F.2d at 1238-39.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1239.
108 Id.
109 Rutledge, 40 F.3d at 882-83.
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ered cocaine and collected debts for Rutledge's drug sales.'15 To
maintain control over his operation, Rutledge secured a cache of fire-
arms which he bought and traded for cocaine." 6
From November 1988 until his arrest inJuly 1989, Rutledge based
his operations in a trailer in Youngstown that he shared with three of
his underlings." 7 In July 1989, the Illinois State Police searched the
trailer based upon statements made by Malott. 118 Upon finding weap-
ons, but no drugs, the police arrested Rutledge." 9 When Rutledge
discovered that Malott had made incriminating statements to the po-
lice, Rutledge threatened Malott and another employee with serious
harm if either testified against him in court.120 Consequently, both
testified before a state grand jury that Rutledge had no involvement
with drugs or guns, forcing the state to release Rutledge.' 2 '
After his release, Rutledge continued his drug operations until
federal authorities arrested him in December 1990.122 The United
States District Court for the Central District of Illinois charged Rut-
ledge with six offenses related to his dealings in drugs and firearms:
operating a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 848, conspiring to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846,
distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (1), possessing a
firearm after being convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922 (g), and two counts of using or carrying a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c).123
After a nine-day trial in which several of Rutledge's employees
testified against him, a jury found Rutledge guilty on each of the six
counts. 124 The court sentenced Rutledge to three terms of life impris-
onment without parole for the CCE offense, the drug conspiracy of-
fense, and the substantive cocaine distribution offense. 125 The court
also sentenced Rutledge to a sentence of ten years imprisonment for
possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, five years imprisonment
for carrying a firearm in relation to drug trafficking, and an additional
115 Id. The employees included Shelly Henson, Richard Hagemaster, Rick Bolen, Randy




119 Id. at 882-83.
120 Id. at 883.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Brief for the United States at 2, Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996)
(No. 94-8769).
124 Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241, 1244 (1996).
125 Brief for the United States at 3, Rutkdge (No. 94-8769).
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ten-year sentence for the similar sixth count. 126 Rutledge was to serve
all six of these prison sentences concurrently. 27 Finally, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3013, the court imposed a fifty-dollar special assessment
on each count for a total of $300.128
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed.' 29 In a pro se supple-
mental brief, Rutledge argued that the conviction and sentence on
both the CCE and conspiracy charge violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment by punishing him twice for the same
offense.' 3 0 Although it agreed with the premise that the conspiracy
charge was a lesser included offense of the CCE charge, the Seventh
Circuit stated that the trial court did not violate Rutledge's Fifth
Amendment rights.' 3' Relying upon its decision in United States v.
Bond,'32 and the Supreme Court decision in Jeffers v. United States,'33
the court held that concurrent sentences for CCE and conspiracy are
permissible when the cumulative punishment does not exceed the
maximum sentence allowable under the CCE statute. 34
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari' 35 to deter-
mine whether the convictions for CCE and conspiracy violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 136
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINION
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit in
a unanimous opinion written by Justice Stevens.' 37 Justice Stevens
agreed that conspiracy is a lesser included offense of CCE.' 38 How-




129 United States v. Rutledge, 40 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1994). This appeal also affirmed
Shelly Henson's and Richard Hagemaster's convictions for conspiring to distribute cocaine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.
1 30 Id. at 886. Other issues raised on appeal and dismissed as meritless included: Rut-
ledge's contention that the court denied him a fair trial because several jurors saw him in
handcuffs outside the courtroom; his contention that testimony regarding his connection
with the Latin Kings was irrelevant and prejudicial and thus the court should have ex-
cluded it; and his contention that because one witness did not did not testify at trial, the
court should have omitted the witness' statements from the presentence report.
131 Id.
132 847 F.2d 1233, 1238 (7th Cir. 1988).
133 432 U.S. 137, 155-57 (1977).
134 Rutledge, 40 F.3d at 886.
'35 Rutledge v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995).
136 Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996).
'37 Id. at 1244.
138 Id. at 1250.
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Congress intended to authorize only one punishment for the act of
conspiring. 3 9 Consequently, one of Rutledge's convictions and the
concurrent sentence constituted impermissible punishment for the
same offense and required vacation. 4°
Justice Stevens began by stating the general rule that courts may
not "prescrib[e] greater punishment than the legislature in-
tended."' 41 Where two statutory provisions address the "same of-
fense," a court must presume that a legislature did not intend to
impose two punishments for that offense.142 According to justice Ste-
vens, the Court determines whether two statutes describe the "same
offense" by applying the test promulgated in Blockburger v. United
States,143 which looked at "'whether each provision requires proof of a
fact which the other does not.' ' 144 Furthermore, Justice Stevens
pointed out that two different statutes define the "same offense" when
one offense is a lesser included offense of the other. 45
The Court then applied the Blockburger rule to Rutledge and deter-
mined that CCE clearly requires proof of additional elements beyond
those of conspiracy.' 46 However, according to Justice Stevens, the
tougher question under Blockburger was whether conspiracy required
proof of any element not included in the CCE offense.' 47
In examining this issue, the Court noted that Jeffers' 48 explicitly
rejected the proposition that the "in concert" element of CCE may be
satisfied by something less than "an actual agreement among the par-
ties" required in a prosecution for conspiracy.149 The Court also
pointed out that appellate courts have consistently held that conspir-
acy is a lesser included offense of CCE.'3 0 For these reasons, the
Court held that conspiracy is not distinguishable from CCE and char-
acterized conspiracy as a lesser included offense of CCE.151
Next, Justice Stevens rejected the Government's argument that
even if conspiracy is a lesser included offense of CCE, the second con-
'39 Id.
140 Id. at 1250-51.
141 Id. at 1245 (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
142 Id. (citing Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 861 (1985); Whalen v. United States,
445 U.S. 684, 691-92 (1980)).
143 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).




148 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
149 Rutklge, 116 S. Ct. at 1246 (citingJeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977)).




viction does not constitute a punishment when the defendant serves
the two sentences concurrently.1 52 According to Justice Stevens, the
fifty-dollar assessment for the second conviction will always constitute
a second punishment.153 Furthermore, regardless of the fifty-dollar
assessment, he determined that the Court's decision in Ball v. United
States'54 limited the Government's argument. 155 Justice Stevens said
that even where a second sentence is served concurrently, the collat-
eral consequences of the second conviction and sentence make it just
as impermissible as a cumulative sentence.' 56 The Court determined
that, at the very least, the fifty-dollar assessment constituted an imper-
missible collateral consequence. 157
Justice Stevens also disagreed that the Government could over-
come the general presumption against allowing multiple punishments
because Congress intended to allow courts to impose them in the case
of CCE and conspiracy.' 58 First, Justice Stevens criticized the Govern-
ment's use of Jeffers'59 to support this argument. 60 He said that the
Court's decision to uphold convictions for conspiracy and CCE in Jef-
fers did not control the present case and, furthermore, had no relation
to congressional intent.16' Justice Stevens noted that the plurality up-
held the convictions there because the petitioner waived his right to
object to the second conviction, while the concurrence maintained
that the two convictions were not for the "same offense."162 Justice
Stevens would not infer a suggestion by the plurality inJeffers that Con-
gress intended to allow dual convictions.I 63
In response to the Government's final argument, Justice Stevens
said that the Court had already developed rules to avoid the need to
provide a "back up" conviction in case a defendant successfully ap-
pealed the greater offense.' 64 Most federal appellate courts have con-
cluded that a court may enter ajudgment for a lesser included offense
when a court reverses a conviction for the greater offense on grounds
that only affect the greater offense. 65 Because neither legislatures
152 IM at 1247-48.
153 Id. at 1247.
154 470 U.S. 856 (1985). See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.




159 432 U.S. 137, 152-54 (1977) (allowing convictions for both conspiracy and CCE).
160 Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241, 1248 (1996).




165 Id at 1250.
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nor courts feel it necessaxy to impose multiple convictions, Justice Ste-
vens rejected the Government's argument that Congress intended to
do so in creating the CCE and conspiracy statutes.' 66
Justice Stevens concluded that narcotics conspiracy constitutes a
lesser included offense of CCE and that Congress did not intend to
authorize more than one punishment for a single act of conspiring.' 67
Therefore, multiple convictions and sentences for CCE and conspir-
acy violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 168 Accordingly, the Court re-
manded the case with instructions to vacate one of Rutledge's
convictions and sentences.' 69
V. ANALYSIS
While the Supreme Court definitively resolved the issue of
whether convictions and sentences for CCE and conspiracy constitute
double jeopardy, the Court's reasoning was troubling for several rea-
sons. In Part A below, this Note argues that the Court inappropriately
disregarded Garrett,'70 the applicable precedent in Rutledge.'71 Part B
contends that the Court applied the wrong test in determining
whether CCE and conspiracy constitute the "same offense" for pur-
poses of double jeopardy. Part C argues that the Court should have
based its decision upon reasoning used in the analogous context of
RICO and conspiracy. Finally, Part D offers as a possible explanation
for the Court's inappropriate decision in Rutledge its conservative ad-
herence to the letter of the law.
A. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED THE GARRE7T REASONING TO
RUTLEDGE
1. Because There is no Legitimate Distinction Between Garrett and
Jeffers, Garrett is the Controlling Precedent in Cases of
Convictions for CCE and Conspiracy such as
Rutledge
The Court should have applied the Garrett reasoning to this case.
In both Garrett and Jeffers, the Court addressed the issue of whether
conviction for CCE and one of its lesser offenses constitutes double




169 Id. at 1250-51.
170 Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
171 Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996).




plurality and the distinction between the two cases is attenuated at
best, the Court should have acknowledged Garrett as a reevaluation of
the CCE statute and applied its reasoning to Rutledge. In doing so, the
Court would have found that Congress intended cumulative punish-
ment for drug conspiracy and CCE.
The Court in Garrett made an unconvincing distinction between
the issue there and the issue inJeffers.173 The Court said that theJeffers
Court based its decision upon a belief that the dangers against which
conspiracy and CCE statutes protect are so similar that there is no
sense in cumulating penalties.174 By contrast, the dangers protected
against by the two crimes in Garrett, drug importation and CCE, are
not so similar as to warrant this same conclusion. 175 Actually, only the
fourjustice plurality in Jeffers believed that the dangers were similar.176
More accurately, the Jeffers Court based its holding on its belief that
CCE already prohibit conspiracy, and this reasoning applies to any of
CCE's predicate offenses. 177 Thus, because the Jeffers Court decided
that convictions for CCE and any one of its predicate offenses consti-
tute double jeopardy, and no legitimate distinction between Garrett
and Jeffers exists, Garrett effectively overruled Jeffers. Accordingly, at
least one circuit has rejected the conclusion that § 848 CCE and § 846
conspiracy protect against similar dangers.' 78
One could argue that the underlying facts supporting CCE and a
substantive predicate offense versus CCE and the narcotics conspiracy
offense justify the Court's distinction between Garrett and Jeffers.179
For example, a defendant could violate the importation statute, sell
the drugs to one other person, and be involved in CCE based upon an
entirely different source of narcotics. On the other hand, if a defend-
ant is working in agreement with at least five others for purposes of
§ 846 conspiracy, he will necessarily be working "in concert" with
them for purposes of § 848 CCE, an argument accepted by the Court
in Rutledge.180 Thus, although convictions for CCE and conspiracy will
always be punishment for the same conduct, punishment for CCE and
17- See Garret, 471 U.S. at 794-95.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 148-50 (1977). Justice White concurred in the
judgment in part and stated that he did not believe that conspiracy is a lesser included
offense of CCE. Id. at 158 (White, J., concurring in the judgement in part and dissenting
in part). Also, the dissenters explicitly rejected the notion that CCE and conspiracy are so
similar as to prohibit convictions for both. Id. at 159 (Stevens,J., concurring in the judge-
ment in part and dissenting in part).
177 See id. at 148-50.
178 See United States v. Fernandez, 822 F.2d 382, 384 (3d Cir. 1987).
179 See Garret4 471 U.S. at 794-95.
180 See Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241, 1246 (1996).
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one of its substantive predicates could be punishment for two separate
and unrelated acts. In this context, multiple convictions for the latter
are distinct and do not constitute double jeopardy.
However, this distinction is irrelevant if Congress intended to
punish a defendant for both CCE and each of its underlying of-
fenses.181 If the CCE and conspiracy statutes protect against distinct
dangers in the same way CCE and its substantive predicate offense
statutes do, Garrett's distinction from Jeffers fails, and Garrett is the ap-
propriate precedent for cases regarding CCE and each of its predicate
offenses. Though not explicitly overruling Jeffers, the Garrett decision
created a new means of analysis for CCE and each of its predicate
offenses. The Court should have applied this more recent analysis to
Rutledge.
2. If the Court Had Applied Garrett to Rutledge, It Would Have Come
to the Conclusion that the Convictions for CCE and Conspiracy
Did Not Constitute Double Jeopardy
The Garrett Court's analysis suggested that the Court should re-
ject double jeopardy claims in subsequent examinations of convictions
for CCE and all of its underlying offenses, including conspiracy.' 8 2
The Court inappropriately failed to follow this direction in Rutledge.
First, the Court's conclusion in Garrett that the language of § 848 cre-
ates a distinct offense, punishable separately from other offenses, ap-
plies to conspiracy in the same way it applies to substantive predicate
offenses. Conspiracy is prohibited by a statute distinct from the CCE
statute just as the other predicate offenses are prohibited by their own
separate statutes.' 83 The Court noted that the language of CCE "af-
firmatively states an offense for which punishment will be im-
posed."184 The Court emphasized the distinction between a statute
that imposes its own penalty and a "recidivist" statute that simply en-
hances the penalty imposed for other violations.185 Because CCE pro-
vides its own penalty, and a separate section of the Controlled
Substances Act 186 provides the recidivist provision, CCE is a distinct
offense.' 87 This reasoning provides support for the proposition that
CCE is distinct from each of its predicate offenses, including conspir-
181 See, e.g., Garrett 471 U.S. at 794-95; Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 369 (1983); see
also infra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
182 See 471 U.S. at 773.
183 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994) (prohibiting narcotics conspiracy); 21 U.S.C. § 921
(1994) (prohibiting narcotics importation).
184 Garrett 471 U.S. at 779.
185 IRL at 781.
186 21 U.S.C. § 849 (1994).
187 Garrett, 471 U.S. at 779.
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acy, and therefore punishable in addition to its underlying offenses.
The Garrett Court's analysis of legislative intent applies to conspir-
acy as well as substantive predicate offenses.188 The Court's analysis
concluded that Congress created CCE as an offense separate from its
predicates. 189 The Court looked to congressional debate over whether
CCE should be a recidivist provision or a new, distinct offense.' 90 The
CCE statute was introduced in the House as a recidivist provision, but
the House Committee substituted that provision with the current CCE
statute.' 9 ' Representative Poff described the statute as embodying "'a
new separate criminal offense with a separate criminal penalty.'"192
In addition, the Garrett Court concluded that the legislative his-
tory gave no indication that Congress intended to substitute the predi-
cate offenses with a conviction under CCE.193 According to the Garrett
Court, specifying that a defendant should be convicted and punished
for both offenses would have been stating the obvious, as the entire
debate suggests that Congress intended to create a new enforcement
tool, not substitute existing tools.1 94 For instance, Representative
Weicker said, "'This bill goes further in providing those persons
charged with enforcing it a wide variety of enforcement tools which
will enable them to more effectively combat the illicit drug trafficker
and meet the increased demands we have imposed on them.'"195
Although some still argue that legislative history is inconclusive as
to whether Congress intended to punish defendants under both CCE
and conspiracy statutes, 196 the Garrett Court squarely rejected this no-
tion.197 The Court pointed out that precedent requires that Congress
"clearly" and "specifically" authorize multiple punishment.198 Faced
with this requirement, the Garrett Court still found the legislative his-
tory conclusive, implying that the history was sufficiently "clear and
specific." 199
188 Id.
189 Id- (citing H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CA.N. 4566, 4651).
190 Id- at 782-84.
191 Id. at 782-83.
192 Id. at 783 (quoting H.RL REP. No. 91-1444); see also 116 CONG. REc. 33302 (1970)
(remarks of Rep. Eckhardt).
193 Garrett, 471 U.S. at 782-85.
194 Id. at 784.
195 Id. at 785 (quoting 116 CONG. Rac. 33630-33631 (1970)).
196 See, e.g., Kenneth G. Schuler, Continuing Criminal Enterprise, Conspiracy, and the Multi-
ple Punishment Doctrine, 91 MICH. L. Ra,. 2220, 2246 (1993).
197 Garrett, 471 U.S. at 784-85.
198 Id.; Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S.
684, 692-93 (1980); see also Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981) (stating that
the Blockburger rule is controlling absent "a clear indication of contrary legislative intent").
199 Garret4 471 U.S. at 785.
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Therefore, as the controlling precedent, the Garrett analysis of
congressional intent applies to conspiracy just as it applies to substan-
tive predicate offenses, and the Court should have applied it as such
in Rutledge. Instead, the Rutledge Court failed to squarely address the
issue of legislative history and only rejected the Government's position
that Congress intended to allow courts to convict defendants for both
CCE and conspiracy.200 The Court therefore failed to give congres-
sional intent the weight it traditionally has been given in issues of
double jeopardy. Had the Court accounted for congressional intent
and applied the Garrett analysis, it would have determined that Con-
gress intended separate and cumulative punishment for CCE and con-
spiracy. Accordingly, it should have determined that conviction and
sentencing for both does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
B. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ADDRESSED THE POSSIBLE
INAPPLICABILITY OF THE BLOCKBURGER ANALYSIS
The Court inappropriately applied the Blockburge201 analysis to
this case. The Court disregarded the ongoing debate over whether the
Blockburger test should apply to the double jeopardy analysis in cases of
compound offenses like CCE or whether, more appropriately, courts
should simply look to congressional intent.202 Justice Stevens utilized
the Blockburger test as the primary means of determining whether con-
spiracy is a lesser included offense of CCE, and therefore concluded
that conviction for both violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.203 The
Rutledge Court should have acknowledged the conflicting approaches
and seized the opportunity to definitively settle the matter.
The first indication that the Blockburger same-element analysis
may not apply to compound offenses appeared injustice Rehnquist's
dissent in Wha/en v. United States.20 4 Justice Rehnquist said, "[T]he
Blockburger test, although useful in identifying statutes that define
greater and lesser included offenses in the traditional sense, is less
satisfactory, and perhaps even misdirected, when applied to statutes
defining 'compound' and 'predicate' offenses."205
Justice Rehnquist's view prevailed in Garrett v. United States.206
There, the Court adopted the presumption that when Congress cre-
200 Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241, 1248-49 (1996).
201 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
202 See, e.g., Whaln, 445 U.S. at 684.
203 Rutledge, 116 S. Ct. at 1245-46.
204 Whalen, 445 U.S. at 708 (RehnquistJ., dissenting).
205 k
206 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
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ates two distinct offenses it intends to permit cumulative sentences. 20 7
This conclusion is antithetical to the Blockburge s08 analysis, which pro-
vides that conviction under two statutes violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause unless Congress explicitly provides otherwise.20 9
The view that Blockburger does not apply to compound offenses
gained further support in United States v. Dixon.210 There, the Court
determined that Blockburger was the correct test for determining
whether two statutes create the "same offense;" however, the Court
could not agree as to the test's applicability to compound offenses.211
Justice Rehnquist again voiced his hesitance in applying Blockburger to
cases of greater and lesser included offenses.212
Unfortunately, the majority in Dixon did not rebut this aspect of
Rehnquist's dissent, thus leaving the disposition of the matter in flux.
Therefore, the debate over whether the Blockburger test applies to com-
pound offenses still exists, and the Rutledge Court inappropriately dis-
regarded it. It is unlikely that the Court's failure to address this issue
reflects its approval of the position that the Blockburger test does apply
to compound offenses. If the Court did condone this position, it
would have explicitly so stated, as it stated its intention to put an end
to the debate over whether convictions for CCE and conspiracy consti-
tute double jeopardy.
Furthermore, had the Court looked to analysis in recent deci-
sions, including Garrett and Dixon, it would have properly concluded
that the Blockburger test certainly does not apply to every compound
offense.
C. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ANALYZED DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN THE
CONTEXT OF RICO
Many courts and scholars have made a sound analogy between
the CCE statute21 3 and the RICO statute. 2 14 Both CCE and RICO re-
207 Id. at 793.
208 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
209 I.
210 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
211 Id. Justice Scalia andJustice Rehnquist agreed that Blockurgercontrolled but did not
agree on how to apply Blockburger to the compound offenses at issue. Id. at 2852; id. at 2865
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
212 Id. at 2868.
213 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1996).
214 21 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994); see, e.g., United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1107-11
(3d Cir. 1990); 22nd Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeals, 1991-1992, 81 GEO. L.J. 853, 1240-44 (1993); Susan W. Brenner, Of Com-
plicity and Enterprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton Liability to RICO Actions, 56 Mo. L. RE%,.
931, 990-1005 (1991); Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection Against Successive Prose-
cutions in Complex Criminal Cases: A Mode 25 CONN. L. REv. 95, 132 (1992).
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quire predicate offenses, and Congress enacted both to combat organ-
ized crime. Thus, although RICO cases are not controlling in the
CCE context, the courts' reasoning in such cases is applicable. In
coming to its decision in Rutledge, the Court improperly disregarded
this analogy.
Courts have found that punishing RICO enterprise and conspir-
acy offenses cumulatively does not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 215 For example, in United States v. Pungitore the Third Circuit
addressed the issue of whether conviction and sentencing for RICO
and conspiracy violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.216 The Pungitore
court stated that Garrett applied to allow cumulative punishments for
RICO and its predicate offense of conspiracy.2 17 The court cited an
earlier Third Circuit case 218 that applied Garrett to RICO and one of
its substantive predicate offenses.21 9 The Pungitore court could not
find any "principled way to distinguish [conspiracy] from [the earlier
predicate offense]." 220 According to the court, legislative history indi-
cating that Congress intended cumulative punishment for RICO and
its substantive predicate offenses applied equally to RICO and
conspiracy.221
Due to the similarities in the RICO and CCE statutes, the
Supreme Court should have looked to the RICO context in deciding
Rutledge. Like the Pungitore court, it should have applied Garrett's anal-
ysis of CCE and its underlying offenses rather than the analysis in Jef-
fers. In doing so, it would have come to the conclusion that Congress
intended to create multiple punishment for CCE and each of its pred-
icate offenses, including conspiracy, and therefore that sentences for
CCE and conspiracy do not constitute Double Jeopardy.
D. THE COURT'S CONSERVATIVE IDEALS REGARDING ITS ROLE EXPLAIN
THE COURT'S DECISION IN RUTLEDGE
Due to the Court's unwillingness to abandon its conservative ide-
als, it inappropriately disregarded precedent and thus arrived at an
improper decision. The Court's decision in Rutledge v. United States,
while seemingly antithetical to much of its recent double jeopardyju-
215 See, e.g., Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1107-11; United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 292 (4th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1477 (11th Cir. 1985); cf. United
States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1040 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (where evidence of RICO
conspiracy and violation is identical, the two charges must merge for sentencing).
216 Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1107-11.
217 Id.
218 United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 286 (3d Cir. 1986).
219 Pugnitore, 910 F.2d at 1108.
220 Id. at 1108 n.24.
221 Id. at 1108.
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risprudence, may reflect the modem Court's commitment tojudicial
restraint.222 One scholar described several criminal law decisions as
indicative of the Court's desire to apply the Constitution and federal
statutes as written, rather than creating new law.223 In particular,
Chief Justice Rehnquist "has shown a willingness to rule in favor of
criminal defendants when their arguments are supported by the plain
meaning or clear history of a particular law."2 4 Put another way, the
Court has demonstrated a marked reluctance to look to legislative his-
tory where the statute itself could provide an acceptable answer.
For instance, in Robinson v. United States,225 the Court unani-
mously struck down a five-year sentence enhancement to a 157-month
cocaine possession sentence.226 The Court based its decision upon
the plain language of a federal enhancement statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (1) (1988).227 The Court emphasized its belief that the
Court's job is to interpret and apply law, while it is up to Congress to
write the law.2 2 8
In another case, Lonchar v. Thomas,22 9 the Court ruled without
dissent in favor of a criminal defendant.230 There, Georgia asked the
Court to exclude a habeas petition based upon the defendant's al-
leged "bad faith delay" in filing the petition.2 3' The Court rejected
this request based upon the plain language of the applicable federal
rule, which placed no restrictions or deadlines on the filing of first
habeas petitions.23 2 Although these decisions may indicate the
Court's willingness to protect criminal defendants, perhaps they can
better be described as favoring the letter of law.2 33
222 See L. Anita Richardson, Translating the Letter of Law: Court's Focus on Interpretation
Brings Surprising Results in Criminal Cases, 82 A.B.A.J. 50 (1996); see also Richard E. Levy &
Robert L. GlicksmanJudicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's Environmental Law
Decisions, 42 VAND. L REv. 343, 346 (1989) (analyzing Supreme Court's emphasis on judi-
cial restraint in its environmental decisions); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern
Supreme Court, 81 CALIF. L Rav. 433, 528 (1993) (stating that Court applies fundamental
value ofjudicial restraint in reviewing economic regulation).
223 Richardson, supra note 222, at 50. But see Michael S. Gershowitz, Note, Waiver of the
Plea-Statement Rules, 86J. GRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 1439 (1996) (discussing United States v.
Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995), where the majority failed to follow the plain meaning of
the statute at issue, but the dissent by Justice Souter relied heavily upon that plain
meaning).
224 Richardson, supra note 222, at 50.
225 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995).
226 Id. at 509.
227 Id. at 506.
228 Id. at 506-9.




233 See Richardson, supra note 222.
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Awareness of this trend of unanimous and near-unanimous deci-
sions makes Rutledge less surprising, and it provides at least a partial
explanation for what motivated the Rutledge Court. For instance,
neither the plain language of the statute nor the legislative history
explicitly provide multiple punishments in Rutledge. Rather than look-
ing to legislative history for evidence of intent, the Court based its
opinion on the plain language, or absence of plain language in the
statute. This desire to apply the letter of the law may also explain the
Rutledge Court's reluctance to apply Garrett, as the analysis there rested
primarily on an examination of legislative history rather than on plain
language.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Rutledge v. United States does not comport
with the trend the Court had been following in the context of contin-
uing criminal enterprise and double jeopardy jurisprudence. If the
Court had looked at the analysis of plain language and legislative his-
tory as described in Garrett v. United States, the possible inapplicability
of the Blockburger test in determining whether two statutes impermissi-
bly punish a criminal defendant for the "same offense," and decisions
in the analogous context of RICO and racketeering conspiracy, it
would have come to an opposite and better reasoned conclusion. The
positive aspect of this decision is that it finally put an end to the ongo-
ing confusion over whether convictions and sentences for continuing
criminal enterprise and narcotics conspiracy violate double jeopardy.
Unfortunately, the grounds upon which the Court based its decision
raise questions as to the soundness and finality of the Court's reason-
ing and stare decisis.
AMYJ. KAPPELER
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